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DO NEGLECTED FIRMS SUFFER FROM AN 
INFORMATION DEFICIT? 
Kenneth Yung, Old Dominion University  
Hamid Rahman, Alliant International University  




We study the presence and distribution of private information in neglected firm stocks using a measure of 
private information first suggested by Roll (1988). Our results suggest that there is no shortage of 
information on neglected firms for investors and that this private information forms part of the decision 
set for managerial decisions. Our results indicate a significant negative correlation between the amount 
of private information and certain important firm characteristics such as market size, cash flow, sales and 
return on assets. When the impact of private information is analyzed on the investment and payout 
policies of the neglected firms, the results indicate that private information in stock price has a significant 
impact on firm investment but not on payout. However, private information does affect payout but 
through interaction with firm cash flow. Finally we find that private information impact on firm 
investment is stronger in smaller as compared to larger neglected firms.  
     
JEL: G14; G35 
 




arket efficiency requires availability of costless information. Much of this information is 
generated by financial analysts for use by the investing public. When stocks, because of the 
small size of the issuing firm or other factors, do not attract the attention of financial analysts, 
they are likely to be priced to provide a significant information risk premium to any potential investor. 
However, investors trade not only on the basis of public information but also on the basis of their private 
information. We study the presence and distribution of private information based on firm characteristics 
and find a strong negative correlation between private information and several firm characteristics. We 
then study the effect of private information on the investment and payout policies of the neglected firms. 
Our results show that private information in price is positively correlated with the level of firm 
investment, while private information in cash flow is positively correlated with the level of payout. We 
surmise that this is private information of investors because of the way in which we construct the sample 
of neglected firms i.e. firms with no analyst coverage and low institutional ownership. This ensures that 
managers of the neglected firms cannot send information through analysts or institutional investors. In 
addition, low insider ownership among the sampled firms suggests that neglected firms’ response to 
private information is less likely to be distorted by managerial incentives. We find that private 
information affect the investment of smaller firms more than that of larger firms. But barring this 
exception, we do not find size, sales or profitability to systematically influence either the investment or 
payout levels of the neglected firms. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the relevant literature, while Section III 











Neglected firms, defined as firms with little or no analyst, media or institutional coverage, are enigmatic. 
Some researchers such as Arbel et al (1983) and Arbel and Strebel (1983) show that neglected stocks earn 
a premium either as compensation for associated information deficiencies and/or pricing inefficiencies 
caused by lack of information. These researchers find the information deficiency premium to average 
10.7% for the 5-year period 1972-76. The neglected firm effect persists whether neglect is measured in 
terms of analyst coverage or actual investment by institutions and even after size and risk are controlled. 
However, if the market for information is efficient, then the information deficit should be fully discounted 
in the price and the observed neglected firm effect may actually be caused by other factors, such as 
missing variables or value-affecting attributes of securities not captured by CAPM or market model. 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) argue that the findings of prior studies of a statistically significant 
independent neglected firm effect may be attributed to using firm size as the control variable rather than 
the more fundamental stock price variable. After controlling for price, they do not find a statistically 
significant neglect effect. They conclude, therefore, that the previously reported neglect effect is a 
premium to cover higher transaction costs of the generally lower priced neglected stocks.  
 
Beard and Sias (1997) also basically arrive at the same conclusion as Bhadwaj and Brooks and conclude 
that there is no information deficiency premium. The extant literature on neglected firms is, therefore, in 
agreement that there is an information deficit for neglected firm stocks, but differs regarding the impact of 
the deficit. According to Bhadwaj and Brooks (1992), and Beard and Sias (1997), the deficit is fully 
discounted in the price and there is no information deficiency premium, but according to Arbel et al. 
(1983) and Arbel and Strebel (1983) the discount, if any, does not fully compensate for the deficit with a 
resultant information deficiency premium. Thus, both strands of literature basically concede an 
information deficit solely on the grounds that neglected firms by definition are firms that are under less 
scrutiny by news agencies, financial analysts, and institutional investors as compared to other firms.  
 
The two strands differ only in whether the information deficit is fully or partially incorporated in the stock 
price.More recent research gives additional support to the existence of a negligent firm premium. Kelly 
and Ljungqvist (2007) estimate the value of analyst coverage as approximately 1% of the stock value 
based on a sample of firms that lose all coverage due to exogenous events. Dhiensiri and Sayrak (2004) 
analyze first time initiation of firms uncovered by analysts. They find returns of about 2% on all 
initiations and 2.3% for positive initiations. Demiroglu and Ryngaert (2010) find even a greater premium 
of +4.86% abnormal return at the announcement that a previously uncovered firm would have analyst 
coverage. Interestingly, the negligent firm premium persists regardless of the association of the analyst. 
Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003, 2008) and Iskoz (2003) find no evidence that analyst recommendations 
are treated differently at announcement if the analyst is affiliated with a covered firm’s lead underwriter 
for a recent SEO or IPO. Downs and Guner (2000) also find that information deficiency is an important 
economic trait but that real estate securities suffer less from neglect. Consistent with the negligent firm 
effect, Barry and Brown (1986) find that limited information is a source of systematic risk. 
   
Investors trade in stocks not only on the basis of analyst recommendations, but also on the basis of private 
information. A true information deficit would exist only if noise trading primarily replaces informed 
trading in the absence of analyst information. If private information substitutes analyst information, then 
prices would fairly reflect the underlying demand and supply of informed traders, and there would be no 
information deficit despite the absence of analyst, media or institutional coverage. Existing studies have 
focused on stock returns to draw their conclusion. We use a different tact and employ price-
nonsynchronicity to measure the Private Information of neglected firms. We then examine if neglected 
firm’s corporate investment (capital expenditure plus R&D) and payout policies (total dividends) are 
affected by investors’ private information. A significant relation would imply that investors have 




information on the neglected firms.Price nonsynchronicity as a measure of Private Information was first 
proposed in a seminal article by Roll (1988) and then further developed amongst others by Morck et al. 
(2000), and Durnev et al (2004). The return generating process of a stock can be viewed as being powered 
by three factors – a market factor, an industry factor and a firm specific factor. The first two factors are 
systematic and if these two factors are primarily responsible for generating the stock return, then the stock 
has a high degree of correlation with market and industry returns and there would be high degree of 
synchronicity between the stock price and the market and industry indices. However, if the firm specific 
factor is the significant return generator then there would be considerable nonsynchronicity between stock 
return and market and industry indices. Roll (1988) suggested that price nonsynchronicity captures private 
information because it has very little correlation with the release of public information such as earnings 
announcements and unemployment statistics. Roll, therefore, surmised that price nonsynchronicity is the 
result of the trading activity of speculators who gather and possess private information. However, Roll 
added a caveat to this suggestion and left open the possibility of an alternative explanation i.e. an 
occasional frenzy or noise trading deriving the prices. Subsequent empirical and theoretical research has 
verified the original Ross (1988) intuition that price nonsynchronicity reflects more private information 
than noise. On the empirical front, Morck et al (2000), Wurgler (2000), Durnev et al (2003), Defond and 
Hung (2004) and Durnev et al (2004)  find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that price 
nonsynchronicity reflects more private information than noise. On the theoretical front, Veldkamp (2006) 
develops a model that predicts a negative correlation between price synchronicity and the amount of 
private information investors produce about a firm – an outcome that validates the Roll (1988) suggestion. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2007. Our sample consists of New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks. We exclude financials (6000-6999), 
utilities (4000-4949), ADRs and REITs. We also omit firms with less than 30 days of trading and firms 
that do not have common shares traded as indicated by CRSP share codes 10 or 11. The degree of neglect 
information in each of the sample stocks is measured by analyst coverage and institutional ownership. 
Analyst coverage is obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) file. Institutional 
ownership data is retrieved from Thomson ONE database.  
  
Each year, we double sort the sample firms by ranking them based on analyst coverage into 10 deciles 
and then by ranking them according to institutional ownership into 10 deciles. We rebalance the portfolio 
every year and define the 100th portfolio in this double-sorted (10x10) matrix as the portfolio of 
neglected stocks. (We also repeat the above process to form a 5x5 double- sorting portfolios and define 
the 25th portfolio as neglected stocks, but we only used the 100th portfolio in the analysis).Stock price and 
return information is obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Investment and other 
financial data are obtained from Compustat. We have 1214 firm-year observations for the sample. The 
methodology used in this research is adapted from Chen et al. (2007). The analysis employs two measures 
of Private Information which are based on the Roll (1988) reasoning that the variation of a stock return 
comprises three components: a market-related variation, an industry related variation, and a firm specific 
variation. Accordingly, we run the following regression: 
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑚 ∙ 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (1) 
 
Where 𝑟𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the return of firm i in industry j at time t, rm,tis the market return at time t, and rj,t is the 
return of industry j at time t. 
 
The R2 of the equation is then used to compute the two measures of Private Information (PI1 and PI2) as 
follows: 




1) PI1 = log[(1- R2)/ R2)]. This measure is used by Durnev et al. (2004) due to the concern that R2 is 
skewed in its distribution.  
 
2) PI2 = 1- R2 . This measure is used by Chen et al. (2007). 
 
The intuition behind the measures is simple. The amount of return that cannot be explained by market and 
industry factors must be the result of private information or noise. Both empirical and theoretical research 
mentioned earlier has established that the portion of return not caused by the systematic factors is mostly 
the result of private information. The basic model we use can be represented as follows: 
  
𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
The dependent variable is either 𝐼𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟(𝐷𝑖𝑡)  
Where 𝐼𝑖𝑡  is firm i’s investment in year t. We measure investment as the normalized sum of a firm’s 
capital expenditure plus spending on research and development (Capex and R&D scaled by beginning of 
year book assets (Ait-1)). 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is firm i’s payout in year t. We measure payout as the normalized sum of a 
firm’s dividend plus stock repurchase of common and preferred stock. 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖  represent year and firm-
fixed effects respectively. 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1  is normalized price and is measured as the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of debt scaled by the book value of assets, all measured at the end of year t-1.  It is 
calculated as price times shares outstanding from CRSP plus Compustat item 6 (book value of assets) 
minus item 60 (book value of equity) divided by the book value of assets. Previous literature suggests that 
firms tend to invest more when stock prices are high, consequently𝛽1  is expected to be positive when the 
dependent variable is 𝐼𝑖𝑡 . 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 is Private Information impounded in the stocks and the two measures 
of Private Information used in this research are PI1 and PI2 described above. 
 
The control variables (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) we use are those that prior studies have shown to be important in 
investment and payout decisions. These variables are: cash flow (CF), value weighted market adjusted 
three year cumulative returns (RETi,t+3), insider ownership (IO) and (LEVERAGE). An interaction term of 
CF with INFOit-1 is also added to control for the effect of cash flow on investment and payout decisions. 
Finally, the reciprocal of assets (1/ASSETSi,t-1) is included for the statistical integrity of the model. Since 
the dependent variables Iit and Dit, and the regressor 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 are scaled by last year’s assets, the addition of 
the control variable 1/ASSETSi,t-1 ensures there is no spurious correlation. 
 
The full model is given in equation 3 and contains the additional interaction term 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1  𝑄𝑖𝑡−1. 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 
Whereas𝛽1 measures the unique effect ofQit-1, the coefficient𝛽2  measures the additional explanatory 
power of 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 contributed by Private Information. 
 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the full sample of 1214 observations. The mean of the 
normalized share price is $1.95, and the mean market size is $275.20 million. The average sale in $ 
millions is $561.13. The dependent variables Capex and R&D and Dividends have means of .09 and .007 
respectively. The large standard deviation of these variables with respect to their means is indicative of 
the wide range of firm characteristics that are found in neglected firms.  
 
  




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean Median  Std. deviation 
Q 1.95 1.35 1.56 
Market Size ($mm) 275.20 12.72 200.70 
Leverage 0.63 0.52 0.77 
Cash Flow (CF) -0.17 0.04 0.86 
Sales ($mm) 561.13 21.13 2184 
Capex and R&D 0.09 0.04 0.17 
ROA -0.01 0.006 0.08 
Sales Growth 0.009 0.001 0.18 
Institutional Ownership (INST) 0.014 0.013 0.005 
Insider Ownership (IOWN) 0.028 0.003 0.051 
Dividends 0.007 0 0.0391 




Private Information by Firm Characteristics 
 
Table 2 compares the size of private information by firm characteristics. We run the regression model in 
equation 1 on the firms in our data set to determine the R2 for the firm. The R2 provides the necessary 
input for computing the two measures of Private Information PI1 and PI2 for each observation. The firms 
are then sorted into quartiles based on various firm characteristics. The last two columns of the table 
respectively provide the incremental difference between Private Information measures PI1 and PI2 for 
firms in the highest and lowest quartile of the characteristic specified in the first column, and the t-statistic 
for the statistical significance of the difference between Q4 and Q1. Neglected firms sorted on the basis of 
market size, cash flow (CF), sales, and return on assets (ROA) show a significant negative difference 
between the highest and lowest quartile firms for both PI1 and PI2. In the case of firms sorted by Q 
(market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of debt scaled by book value of 
assets), the difference between Q4 and Q1 is negative and statistically significant only for PI1 and that too 
at the 10% level while PI2 is not significant. Firms sorted on the basis of insider ownership (IOWN) show 
a negative difference between Q4 and Q1 but only PI1 is significant.  
 
Our results show that firms with higher values of the characteristics discussed above have significantly 
less private information than firms with lower values. This is to be expected. Private information is 
incorporated into price through the trading activities of private investors. The stock prices reflect both 
public and private information about firm fundamentals. For firms with higher Q, market size, cash flow, 
sales, return on assets and insider ownership, public information will overwhelm private information. 
Firms with lower values of these characteristics have little available public information and the price is 
largely determined by the trading activities of private investors and speculators. Firms sorted on the basis 
of leverage, capital expenditure, sales growth and institutional ownership do not show significant 














Table 2: Comparing the Size of Private Information by Firm Characteristics 
 















































































































































Table 2 compares the size of private information by firm characteristics. We run the regression model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑚 ∙  𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡on the firms in our data set to determine the R2 for the firm. The R2 provides the necessary input for computing the two measures of Private 
Information PI1 and PI2 for each observation. The firms are then sorted into quartiles based on various firm characteristics. The last two 
columns of the table respectively provide the incremental difference between Private Information measures PI1 and PI2 for firms in the highest 
and lowest quartile of the characteristic specified in the first column, and the t-statistic for the statistical significance of the difference between 
Q4 and Q1. ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Effect of Private Information on the Investment Level of Neglected Firms 
 
Table 3 gives the result of estimating equations 2 and 3 using investment (Capital expenditure plus R&D) 
as the dependent variable. We estimate a total of eight different versions. Models 1 and 3 are versions of 
equation 2 in which the measure of private information is PI1. The two models differ from each other in 
that the control variables in Model 1 are cash flow, future returns (Ret) and reciprocal total assets (1/TA) 
while Model 3 has in addition the control variables insider ownership (IO) and Leverage. Models 2 and 4 
are versions of equation 3 in which the measure of private information is PI1. The two models differ from 
each other in that the control variables in Model 2 are cash flow, future returns (Ret) and reciprocal total 
assets (1/TA) while Model 4 has in addition the control variables insider ownership (IO) and Leverage. 
Models 5,6,7 and 8 are respectively repeat of Models 1,2,3 and 4 but use PI2 as the measure of private 
information instead of PI1.  
 
Models 1 and 5 are the base models for PI1 and PI2 respectively. The results indicate that the only 
significant variable in both the models is Q. This is indicative of the fact that the amounts expended for 
investments by neglected firms are positively correlated with the price, just as they are in firms that are 
not neglected (Chen et al. 2007). Models 3 and 7 tag on two additional control variables, namely insider 




ownership and leverage, to the base models 1 and 5, but the results are very similar to the base model 
results. The two additional control variables are not significant indicating that neither insider ownership 
nor leverage has any bearing on the firm’s investment decision. Models 2 and 6 introduce the cross 
product terms – the interaction of private information with Q and cash flow into the base models. The 
results are dramatically different. Q loses significance and the significance is transferred to the cross 
product term of private information and Q. The significance of this cross product term shows that the 
investment to price sensitivity is higher for firms whose stock prices have greater firm specific return 
variation. The loss of significance for Q shows that neglected firms without much monitoring may invest 
without regard to Q. But once investors express their views through a significant and positive PI*Q firm 
managers of neglected firms incorporate PI in their investment decisions. The only other significant term 
is PI1 in model 2 which is negatively related to investments. The corresponding measure of private 
information PI2 in model 6 has a negative sign but is not significant. The negative sign is a reflection of 
the fact that private information is negatively related to firm characteristics such as Q, market size, cash 
flows, sales and ROA. Since investment is likely to have a positive relation with these firm 
characteristics, it will result in a negative relationship with private information.  Models 4 and 8 include 
the additional control variables insider information and leverage but the results of these models are not 
substantially different from models 2 and 6. The control variables are not significant in any of the models. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results on the Relation between Firm Investments and Investors’ Private Information 
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Adj R2  0.07 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 ∙
𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  are used in the regression respectively. The dependent variable is Total Investments (Whole sample).  Clustered 
standard errors are used to account for serial correlations due to firm and year effects. ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively 
 
Effect of Private Information on Investments of Firms by Size, Sales and Profitability 
 
We study the effect of private information on firm investment by sorting the firms in our sample on the 
basis of size, sales and profitability into four quartiles. We run the regression given in equation 3 with all 
the control variables but report only the coefficients for the significant variables in Table 4.  




Table 4: Regression Results on the Relation between Firm Investments and Investors’ Private Information 
On Subsamples (Dependent Variable Is Capex + R&D)  
 
PANEL A: Investment Regressions by Firm Size 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
 Q1 
 Smallest) 
























































    
PI2 
 




























Adj R2  0.43 0.36 0.55 0.17 0.39 0.36 0.54 0.14 
Panel B:  Investments Regressions by Firm Sales 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
 Q1  
(Smallest) 
























































    
PI2 
 




























Adj R2  0.55 0.24 0.23 0.12 0.47 0.29 0.23 0.13 
Panel C: Investments Regressions by Firm Profitability 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
 Q1  
(Lowest) 
























































    
PI2 
 




























Adj R2  0.30 0.35 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.35 0.07 0.10 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is used in the subsample regression. In Panel A 
the firms are sorted on the basis of size with Q4 containing the largest firms and Q1 the smallest.  In Panel B the firms in our sample were sorted 
by sales with Q4 containing the firms with the highest sales and Q1 the firms with the lowest sales.  In Panel C the firms are sorted by 
profitability. The dependent variable is total investments. Clustered standard errors are used to account for serial correlations due to firm and 
year effects. ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For brevity, only the salient variables are 
reported. 
 
We estimate the regressions using both PI1 and PI2 as measures of private information. In Panel A of 
Table 4 the firms are sorted on the basis of size with Q4 containing the largest firms and Q1 the smallest. 




PI1*Q is significant at the 1 percent level for firms in Q1. The level of significance drops as the firm size 
increases and in the fourth quartile Q4, PI1*Q becomes insignificant and the coefficient turns negative. 
The result using PI2 as the measure of private information is somewhat similar. PI2*Q is significant in 
Q1 and Q2 but loses significance in Q3 and Q4. This shows that the effect of private information on 
investment depends largely on the size of the neglected firms. PI1 and PI2 in the second quartile Q2 have 
negative coefficients that are significant at the ten percent level. PI2*CF is positive and significant at 5 
percent for the smallest quartile firms. This indicates that the private information impounded in the cash 
flow is most important for the smallest firms. 
 
 
In Panel B of Table 4, the firms in our sample were sorted by sales with Q4 containing the firms with the 
highest sales and Q1 the firms with the lowest sales. PI1 and PI2 are found to be significantly negatively 
correlated with investments only in Q2. PI2*Q is significantly positively correlated with investments at 
the 10 percent level in Q2. PI1*CF is negatively correlated with investments at the 5 percent level in Q1. 
The sorting by sales does not show any clear cut pattern of the way in which sales level of a firm impacts 
its investment policy through the mechanism of private information. 
In Panel C of Table 4, the firms are sorted by profitability. The PI*Q term, which is the main variable of 
interest, begins to show a little pattern. The smaller firms in Q1 and Q2 show a significant positive 
correlation of PI*Q with investments but PI*Q is neither significant nor consistent in its coefficient signs. 
The coefficient of PI*Q for Q3 is negative and not significant while that of Q4 is positive and not 
significant. This implies that the investment to price sensitivity is higher for firms whose stock prices 
have lower underlying profitability. PI1*CF is positively correlated with investments, and significant for 
firms with the lowest profitability in Q1 and the highest profitability in Q4. PI2*CF is positively 
correlated with investments but with statistical significance only for the least profitable firms in Q1. This 
indicates that private information in cash flows is much more important for firms with small profitability 
as compared to firms with large profitability. Although PI1 is negatively correlated and significant for 
firms in Q2 and Q4 quartiles of profitability and PI2 is negatively correlated and significant for firms in 
the Q2 quartile of profitability, the lack of any systematic pattern precludes any conclusion of a 
systematic relationship with profitability. 
 
Effect of Private Information on the Payout of Neglected Firms 
 
Table 5 shows the results of estimating regressions 2 and 3 with dividend payout as the dependent 
variable. Models 1 to 8 of Table 5 exactly parallel Models 1 to 8 of Table 3 except for the dependent 
variable. 
 
The noteworthy feature of the results reported for models in Table 5 is the complete lack of any statistical 
significance for the independent variable Q, either in the standalone form or in an interaction term in 
determining the payout of neglected firms. The most significant variable determining payout is cash flow. 
This is consistent with the extant literature on dividend payout that ceteris paribus firms with higher cash 
flows will have higher dividend payout. The effect of private information on payout is also through its 
interaction with cash flow. Both PI1*CF and PI2*CF are significantly negatively related with payout at 
the 10 percent significance level. Because private information is negatively related to cash flow as seen in 
Table 2 and cash flow is positively related to payout, the cross-product term is negative. None of the 









Table 5: Regression Results on the Relation between Firm Payout Decisions and Investors’ Private 
Information 
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Adj R2  0.19 0.31 0.91 0.31 0.17 0.30 0.16 0.30 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 ∙
𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  are used in the regression respectively. The dependent variable is Total Dividends (Whole sample).  Clustered 
standard errors are used to account for serial correlations due to firm and year effects. ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively 
 
Effect of Private Information on Payout of Firms by Size, Sales and Profitability 
 
We study the effect of private information on dividend payout by sorting the firms in our sample on the 
basis of size, sales and profitability into four quartiles. This study parallels in all respects the study on 
investments reported in Section V except that the dependent variable here is payout instead of 
investments. We estimate equation 3. The result of this analysis is reported in Table 6 whose three panels 
are similar in construct to the three panels of Table 4.Table 6: Regression Results on the Relation between 
firm investments and investors’ private information on subsamples (dependent variable is Total 
Dividends)  
 
When the sample is sorted by firm size in Panel A, the effect of private information on the payout of 
different sized neglected firms can be seen acting out in many more ways than in the aggregate sample. 
However, this effect is confined to particular quartiles and there is no systematic variation by size. Thus, 
PI1 is positively correlated with payout at a 5 percent significance level for the firms in quartile Q4 but is 
negatively correlated without statistical significance for firms in Q1 and Q3. Similarly PI1 acting through 
Q is significantly negatively related at the 5 percent level with payout for quartile Q4, but quartiles Q1 to 
Q3 show no significance and the sign of the coefficients vary without a consistent pattern. The effect of 
private information in the cash flow (PI1*CF) on the payout is significant for Q1 and Q3 at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively, but the size and sign of the coefficients vary in an erratic manner.  
 
The story is similar when PI2 is used as the measure of private information. PI2 in its standalone form has 
a significant effect on the payout decision for firms in quartiles Q1, Q2 and Q4 but the sign of the 




coefficients alternate between negative and positive from Q1 to Q4. The effect of PI2 in Q and CF i.e. the 
cross product terms PI2*Q and PI2*CF, are significant in some quartiles but with erratic changes in the 
coefficient size and sign, it is hard to attribute the significance to the size effect; rather it is likely 
imparted by a coincidental congregation of some other firm characteristics of the firms in the quartile that 
impart statistical significance to it.Panel B gives the result of estimating equation 3 after sorting the firms 
into quartiles by sales. Q4 contains the firms with the highest sales and Q1, the firms with the least sales.  
 
Table 6:   Payout Regressions 
 
PANEL A Payouts Regressions by Firm Size 
 Q1  
(Smallest) 
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Adj R2  0.62 0.04 0.41 0.46 0.60 0.05 0.39 0.43 
Panel B: Payouts Regressions by Firm Sales 
 Q1  
(Smallest) 
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Adj R2  0.16 0.25 0.47 0.48 0.19 0.24 0.42 0.46 
Panel C: Payouts Regressions by Firm Profitability 
 Q1  
(Lowest) 
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Adj R2  0.11 0.80 0.45 0.65 0.11 0.53 0.41 0.77 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is used in the subsample regression. In Panel A 
the firms are sorted on the basis of size with Q4 containing the largest firms and Q1 the smallest.  In Panel B the firms in our sample were sorted 
by sales with Q4 containing the firms with the highest sales and Q1 the firms with the lowest sales.  In Panel C the firms are sorted by 
profitability. The dependent variable is total dividends. Clustered standard errors are used to account for serial correlations due to firm and year 
effects. ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For brevity, only the salient variables are reported. 
 




The effect of PI1 in the standalone form, and acting through Q is significant in Q4, and acting through CF 
is significant in Q3. However, the erratic variability of coefficient signs precludes assigning the 
significance to firm sales. With the other measure of private information, PI2, the standalone value of PI2 
and PI2*Q are significant for the largest Q4 firms but again the coefficients vary without any systematic 
pattern in the quartiles. 
 
 
Panel C gives the result of estimating equation 3 after sorting the firms into quartiles by firm profitability. 
Q4 contains firms with the highest profitability and Q1 the firms with the least. PI1 and PI1*Q are 
significant for Q3 but there is no pattern in the coefficient signs. The effect of PI1*CF on payout is 
uniformly negative for all four quartiles and significant for Q1 and Q3. Although the results establish a 
negative correlation, but the nonsystematic variation in the coefficients precludes any definitive statement 
on the private information effect of profitability on the payout of the neglected firms. The results of using 




Previous researchers have assumed an information deficit in the case of neglected firm stocks because 
these firms have little or no analyst, institutional or media coverage. However, these researchers did not 
specifically consider the private information content impounded in the price of these stocks as a result of 
the activities of private traders. The goal of this paper was to study the presence and distribution of 
private information in neglected firm stocks and the impact of private information on the investment and 
payout policies of neglected firms. We use two measures of private information developed by Durnev et 
al. (2004) and Chen et al (2007) both of which are based on Roll (1988).  
 
We employ a regression methodology where investment or payout is the dependent variable and 
normalized price and private information are the independent variables along with a set of control 
variables. We find that the extent of private information in neglected firm stocks varies with certain firm 
characteristics. Thus, we find a significant negative correlation between the amount of private information 
and the market size, cash flow, sales and return on assets of neglected firms. One of the two measures of 
private information that we use also provides evidence that this statistically significant negative 
correlation with private information persists even with normalized price and insider ownership. We 
further find that the investment activity of neglected firms is positively impacted by the amount of private 
information in the price of neglected firm stocks. An analysis of the private information effect on the 
investment policy by size, sales and profitability reveals that the private information impounded in the 
price is most important for the smallest firms. There appears to be no systematic effect of private 
information on the investments of the firms based on their sales and profitability. We find that the effect 
of private information on the payout of the firm takes place through private information impounded in its 
cash flow rather than in its price. There is no systematic impact on this relationship based on the size, 
sales or profitability of the neglected firms. 
 
A limitation of the study is that the findings are historical and it cannot be said with certainty whether the 
relationships found in this study will persist in the future. A useful avenue for future research would be to 
test for the stability of our findings on an out of sample period, but such a test must await the lapse of a 
sufficient time period so that a meaningful out of sample data becomes available.  
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